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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH 
ST;..TE GF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Re~pondent, : Case 
No. 
~\VRENCE R. SEYMOUR, 10596 
Defendant and Appellant . : 
- --------------
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF 
CASE 
This is an action in which the appellant 
'Nas ch;:irged for the crime of attempting to obtain 
r::cney by means of false pretenses, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter l, Section 30, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. 
-2-
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury. From ·a 
verdict of guilty, and sentence of the Court, the 
appellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a. reversal of the 
conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 10, 1964, a Complaint was 
filed against the defendant charging him with the 
crime of attempting to obtain money by means of 
false pretenses. ( R. 3) A warrant of arrest was 
issued and the appellant appeared without counsel 
before the Honorable: Horace C. Beck, Judge of the 
City Court of Salt Lake, Salt Lake Col.lnty, State of 
Utah on August 11, 19 64. ( R. 3) The arraign-
ment was continued to August 18, 1964, to afford 
the accused an opportunity to secure counsel., (R. 3) 
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and he was placed in the County Jail. 
On August 18, 1964, appellant again 
appeared before the Court without counsel. Hear-
ing was set for October 8, at which time appellant 
was present without counsel and the Court con-
tinued the matter to November 12, to give appellant 
further opportunity to secure counsel. ( R. 3) On 
November 12, 1964 appellant had still not obtaine~ 
counsel and the Court set the next hearing date for 
December 3. Prior to that hearing, the appellant 
wrote to Judge Beck a letter ( R. 4) , part of which 
reads as follows: 
" So now as a result, of my car being 
looted while supposedly under city 
protection-- I will not be able to 
obtain my own counsel- and because 
of my past record- the limited work 
court appointed counsel can do-- I have 
no other choice but to accept same, 
waive the hearing-- and plead guilty" 
{R .10) ( Underline ours) 
-4-
On December 3rd, 19 64, appellant was 
brought before the Court without counsel. The 
Minute Entry reads as follows: 
"December 3, 19 64, Defendant 
presented without counsel. Upon 
advice of his counsel, Ken 
Hisatake, defendant waived his 
preliminary hearing, the State 
consenting thereto. Court 
ordered defendant bound over to 
District Court to stand trial. 
Court ordered bail $2, 000. 00." 
Appellant was arraigned on December 14, 
1964 in District Court and entered a plea of Not 
Guilty. ( R. 18). Prior to the commencement of 
trial, appellant's trial counsel moved the Court to 
qua sh the information upon the ground that ap-
pellant was without counsel at the preliminary 
hearing. ( R. 40) The motion was denied and ap-
pellant was convicted upon jury trial of attempting 
to obtain money by means of false pretenses as 
charged in the information. ( R. 19-A) 
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At the conclusion of trial, appellant moved 
the Court for a new trial upon the basis that he was 
not represented by counsel at the preliminary hear-
ing, contrary to Article I, Sec. 12 of the Utah 
Constitution and in violation of the due process 
laws under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution of the United States . ( R. 21) 
Thereafter, appellant's trial counsel withdrew and 
~he Court appointed this writer to represent appellant 
as counsel for purposes of the motion. ( R. 24, 25) 
Argument was heard by the Court and the motion 
was continued to secure an Affidavit from attorney 
Hisatake regarding his purported services in ap-
pellant's behalf at the preliminary hearing. The 
affidavit was submitted ( R. 29) wherein attorney 
Hisatake deposed that he neither appeared as coun-
sel for appellant at the preliminary hearing nor did he 
advise appellant to waive preliminary hearing. 
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Appellant's motion for a new trial was taken under 
advisement and subsequently denied. ( R. 31) 
This appeal was taken therefrom. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE FAILURE TO FURNISH THE 
AID OF COUNSEL AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
STAGE, AND TO ACCEPT APPELLANT'S WAIVER OF 
PRELIMINARY HEARING WIT HO UT THE APPEARANCE 
OF COUNSEL IN HIS BEHALF OR WAIVER THEREOF, 
VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT I AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION I 
SECTIONS 7 AND 12 I ARTICLE I. 
It is a fundamental concept of state and 
federal constitutional law that an accused has the 
right to the appointment of counsel sufficiently in 
advance of trial to permit the effective preparation 
for trial. This is an element of due process of law 
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guaranteed the accused by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Powell v Alabama, 28 7 U. S. 45 ( 19 32). 
A similar provision is embodied in Article I, Sections 
7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution. Although these 
constitutional provisions are far sweeping in their 
language, it has been settled law that the guarantee 
of counsel does not apply to every step in the criminal 
prosecution, but only to what has come to be de-
nominated, with some circularity 11 critical stages 11 
of the criminal proceeding. 
It has been held that arraignment could be 
considered a " critical stage 11 in a criminal proceeding 
in the case of Hamilton v Alabama, 368 U. S. 52, 
( 19 61) . Title 7 7-22-12, Ulah Code Annotated, 19 5 3, 
similarly provides that the right to counsel is 
applicable to the arraignment in Utah. 
In 19 63, the United States Supreme Court 
examined the question whether a preliminary hearing 
-8-
was such a " critical stage" in a criminal proceeding 
as to require the appointment of counsel. White v 
Maryland, 3 73 U. S. 59 ( 1963). In that case, the 
accused, unrepresented by counsel at a preliminary 
hearing, entered a plea of guilty to a capital offense 
and that plea was offered in evidence against him at 
the trial after he had, on advice of counsel, pleaded 
not guilty at arraignment. The court held that Hamil-
ton v Alabama, supra, required reversal of the con-
viction even though the Maryland Court of Appeals 
had declared that under state law the accused had 
not been required to plead at the preliminary hearing 
nor were any rights or defenses preserved or lost at 
that time. White v State, 177, A. 2d 8 77, 881-82 
(Md. 1961). In its decision, the U. S. Supreme 
Court compared the critical stage of an arraignment 
to that of a preliminary hearing in the following 
language: 
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11Whatever may be the normal function 
of the 'preliminary hearing r under 
Maryland law, it was in this case 
as 'critical' a stage as arraignment 
under Alabama law. For petitioner 
entered a plea before the magistrate 
and that plea was taken at a time 
when he had no counsel. 
" We repeat what we said in 
Hamilton v Alabama... that we do 
not stop to determine whether 
prejudice resulted: ' Only the 
presence of counsel could have 
enabled this accused to know all 
the defenses available to him 
and to plead intelligently• II r 
373U.S. 59, 60. 
The distinction between capital and non-
capital offenses concerning the right to counsel at 
trial seems likely to have been erased in the case 
of Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 ( 1963). As 
Justice Clark observed in his concurring opinion, 
"The constitution makes no distinction 
between capital and non-capital cases. 
The Fourteenth Amendment requires due 
process of law for the deprival of 'liberty' 
just as for the deprival of 'life' and there 
-10-
cannot constitutionally be a difference 
in the quality of the process based 
merely upon a supposed difference in 
the sanction involved." 
3 72 u • s • 335 I 349 • 
An examination of the record in the instant 
case does not require an over-extension of the fore-
going authorities to support a reversal of the con-
viction. Appellant remained 115 days in the county 
j:oil from the time of his arrest on August 10, 1964 
until he was bound over to the District Court. During 
all of this time he was unable to secure counsel. The 
record does not reveal the appearance of counsel in 
behalf of appellant at any proceeding before the 
magistrate. In total despair, the appellant wrote to 
Judge Beck ( R. 4-lOJ stating he would waive pre-
liminary hearing, accept Court appointed counsel 
and plead gl.Il1ty. Thereafter, on December 3, 1964, 
~he magistrate permitted the appellant to waive pre -
lirninary hearing but did not appoint counsel for 
him prior to accepting the waiver. The failure of the 
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court to comply with appellant's request for court 
appointed counsel, or the failure of the court to 
appoint counsel on its own motion when appellant 
agreed to waive his right to a critical stage in the 
criminal proceeding constituted a violation of the 
appellant's constitutional rights. 
The minute entry in the City Court ( R. 3) 
states that appellant's waiver of the preliminary 
hearing was upon advice of attorney Hisatake, im-
plying that appellant had counsel at that hearing. 
Mr. Hisatake denied having given this advice. ( R. 29) 
In any event, no appearance was made by Mr. 
Hisatake either personally or by pleading at any 
phase of the criminal proceeding before the magis-
trates court. The Court's willingness to accept a 
waiver of the hearing without counsel under these 
circumstances and particularly after appellant had 
requested court- appointed counsel was a violation 
-12-
of constitutional rights of appellant. 
Some courts have held that the absence 
of counsel at the preliminary hearing is not a 
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights 
~f the absence of counsel is not, in the eyes of the 
court, prejudicial. People v Daniels 199 N. E. 2d 
33, (Ill. 1964). It would appear that Utah has pre-
viously followed this line of reasoning in State v 
Braasch, 119 U 450, 229 P2d 289 ( 1951). 
"*** Thus, at the preliminary hearing 
the state ought to provide counsel for 
any defendant desiring but unable to 
procure counsel for himself. This 
should have been made clear to def-
endants before they decided whether 
they were ready for that hearing. 
"But under the circumstances of this 
case such failure did not constitute 
prejudicial error.*** The defendant 
must be present at a preliminary 
hearing and is always entitled to 
counsel which, if necessary, the state 
must provide. *** Under such circum-
stances a preliminary hearing without 
counsel is only invalid where prejudice 
is shown." 
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In most, if not all instances an insur-
mountable burden is imposed upon an accused to 
show prejudice where he has waived preliminary 
hearing in the absence of counsel. He may claim 
that without counsel he does not know whether to 
demand or waive a hearing or how to cross examine 
witnesses and is not prepared to effectively discuss 
with t~.e prosecuting attorney possible reduction of the 
charges against him. He may claim that he is in-
capable of benefitting from the value of the pre-
liminary hearing as a discovery device as emphasized 
in Washington v Clemmer, 339 F 2d 715 ( D. C. Cir. 
1964). Or he may claim that without counsel he was 
unaware that the state had the burden at the pre-
liminary hearing to establish probable cause to 
believe that the defendant was guilty of the crime 
charged and that failure by the state to meet this 
burden must result in the discharge of the defendant. 
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These generalities as to the benefits of 
counsel at the preliminary hearing stage of the 
criminal proceeding are usually insufficient, how-
ever, to show prejudice where counsel has not been 
L..:mished the defendant at that phase of the prosecut-
ion. Thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused 
to consider the element of prejudice when a constitut-
ional right has been denied. 
"In this case, as in those, the degree 
of prejudice can never be known. Only 
the presence of counsel could have 
enabled this accused to know all the 
defenses available to him and to plead 
intelligently~' Hamilton v Alabama, supra. 
" We repeat what we said in Hamilton v 
Alabama. . • that we do not stop to 
determine whether the prejudice 
resulted: ' Only the presence of counsel 
could have enabled this accused to 
know all the defenses available to 
him and to plead intelligently ." ' 
White v Maryland, supra. 
Also, Justice Cohen, dissenting in the 
Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth ex rel 
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Maisenhelder v Rundle, 198 A. 2d 565, ( 1964) 
observed that: 
11Even though there is no showing 
of prejudice, I would reverse 
since the rationale of White v State 
of Maryland. . . and Hamil ton v 
Alabama ..• does not require such 
a showing. 
The argument that a preliminary hearing is 
a critical stage in a criminal proceeding acquires 
added force by the Utah legislation adopted in 1965 
which provides for the appointment of counsel at or 
before the preliminary hearing. 77-64- 4 Utah 
Code Attotated, 1953, as amended. Also, the ex-
tension of the constitutional right to counsel 
established in Escobedo v Illinois, 3 78 U. S. 4 78 
(1964), indicates the" critical" nature of that stage 
of the criminal proceeding. There, the court held 
that an accused had been denied the assistance of 
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment as made 
obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth 
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;..mendment where a criminal ir:vestigation begins to 
focus upon particular suspects and the suspect has 
requested and been denied opportunity to consult 
with the lawyer. Justice Gdd:Oerg, writing the 
'.Tlajority opinion, said: 
"The 'guilding hand of counsel' was 
essential to advise petitioner of his 
rights in this delicate situation. 
Powell v Alabama*** This was the 
' stage when legal aid and advice' 
were the most critical to petitioner. 
Massiah v United States*** It was 
a stage surely as critical as was the 
arraignment in Hamil ton v Alabama 
*** and the preliminary hearing in 
White v Maryland***" 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the aid of competent 
counsel at every stage of the criminal proceeding is 
a fundamental constitutional right guaranteed at all 
critical stages in a criminal proceeding. A pre-
Lminary hearing is a critical stage in a criminal 
]'.Croceeding for which an accused is entitled to 
-17-
counsel. Judge Beck denied appellant his 
constitutional right to counsel at the preliminary 
hearing when he accepted the waiver of said hear-
ing without furnishing counsel prior thereto. It is 
elementary that an accused must clearly understand 
the nature the right he is asked to waive before he 
actually waives that right or before he can be said 
to have waived that right and appellant could not 
clearly understand the nature of that right without 
counsel. 
Appellant earnestly submits that he has 
been denied the right to counsel at a critical stage 
in the criminal proceeding in- violation of his 
constitutional rights and that the Court should 
reverse the conviction herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILFORD A. BEESLEY 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
